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introduction
An analysis of continuities and changes in Brazilian foreign policy during 
Lula’s administration is only possible through careful observation of the two 
mandates under his power. This assertion stems from the fact that there was, 
during these eight years, a gradual process of structuring and consolidating the 
country’s foreign policy. In this sense, Lula’s foreign policy during 2006-2010 can 
only be read together with the structural modifications promoted during his first 
tenure1. This is valid for all the issues in the foreign policy agenda, but especially 
important for security. 
The gradual process mentioned above allowed a new and remarkable feature 
on Brazil’s foreign policy: the movement from a reactive to a more assertive 
approach towards security issues. Indeed, in Lula’s first mandate there was an 
emphasis on reacting to proposals related to terrorism presented by United States 
and also those discussed in the Organization of American States (OAS); in the 
second one, it is possible to identify a considerably active role as regards security 
issues, such as the deploy of Brazilian troops to join the stabilization mission in 
Haiti, the negotiations with Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) for 
hostage liberation, the mediation on the controversy on nuclear energy involving 
Iran, among others. It can be argued that, until Lula’s first administration, Brazil 
didn’t have a security policy at the regional level. Due to this “vacuum” left by 
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Brazil, the initiative towards security issues in South America has been traditionally 
taken by the United States.
Furthermore, Lula’s second mandate reveals a “worldlization” of the 
foreign policy agenda on security – in contrast with the regionalization that 
has characterized Brazil’s foreign policy in this area. Of course, the country’s 
involvement in debates, for instance, on Middle East security issues has always 
existed. Nevertheless, the proactive aspect in Brazil’s foreign policy constitutes 
the main feature that distinguishes Lula’s second mandate from the past 
administrations.
Having these ideas as its fundamental base, this paper is structured in four 
sections. First, it deeply analyzes what we consider to be Brazil’s “reactive approach” 
towards security issues during Lula’s first mandate (2002-2006). The second 
and third sections focus on the two main elements in relation to which a more 
assertive approach can be identified: the expansion of the foreign policy agenda 
in terms of security towards global issues; and the innovative features through 
which Brazil’s security policy towards South America was exercised during Lula’s 
second mandate. The last section of this paper analyses the impacts of the elements 
mentioned above over Brazil’s relations with the United States.
The reactive period
Lula’s first mandate conserves, in general terms, the major characteristics that 
have prevailed since Itamar Franco’s administration (1992-1993)2 (Villa; Viana, 
2008) a period known as “autonomy through integration”. This doctrine was 
essentially different from the one called “autonomy through distance”, attributed 
to Brazilian foreign policy from Ernesto Geisel’s (1974-1979) to José Sarney’s 
government (1985-1988).
“Autonomy through distance” presented as its main pillars: i) the 
diversification of diplomatic and trade relations; ii) the stabilization of Brazil’s 
identity as a developing and Third World country, as well as the country’s 
intensive participation in international regimes related to these categories3; iii) the 
condemnation of international asymmetries in international trade, finance and 
nuclear regimes; and iv) the claim for dialogue among nations in the North-South 
axis instead of the East-West axis4.
After Itamar Franco, foreign policy is used in a more systematic way in 
order to achieve development, an effort made through a model that combined 
autonomy of action before the international scenario with active participation 
2 This position is not consensual: some analysts identify structural differences in Lula’s foreign policy, in 
comparison to the past governments. See, for example, Guilhon Alburquerque (2007) e Weintraub (2007).
3 For instance, Non-Aligned Movement and G-77 (which congregates developing countries).
4  For more information about “autonomy through distance” doctrine features, see: Sennes, 2003; Vizentini, 2003.
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in international fora and diversification of external relations. This new doctrine 
was guided by an attempt to build an identity focused on Brazil’s continental 
proportions, which stressed regional integration as a new form of international 
insertion. Furthermore, “autonomy through participation” aimed at articulating 
the aspiration of being a global trader in the medium term with that of being a 
political global player in the long term.
These goals were followed mainly by three means. First, the Third World 
activism that characterized previous governments was gradually substituted by 
a more positive approach towards international regimes, which meant an active 
participation in multilateral organizations such as World Trade Organization 
(WTO), United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Nevertheless, in all of these fora, Brazil’s participation included an active 
critique about the asymmetries perpetrated by these regimes5.
Secondly, Brazil built a more constructive agenda with United States, 
maintaining at the same time Brazilian foreign policy’s autonomy. This position 
can be illustrated by trade liberalization, privatizations of several governmental 
companies and the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – 
denounced as unfair by Brazilian diplomacy since the 1960’s.
Finally, in South America, Brazil gave priority to Mercosur as a special locus 
for reaffirming its regional leadership (Campos, 2000; Vigevani et al., 2004). This 
stage was privileged in Brazil’s strategy not only in regard to trade and political 
integration: for security matters, this is also valid.
The security agenda during Lula’s first mandate gave continuity to the same 
guidelines performed by Brazilian foreign policy; specifically in terms of security 
issues, there were no wide ruptures, comparably to the previous administrations, 
towards some concerns arising within the continent.
The security reactive agenda was outlined around three points: i) the position 
on the new architecture for security in the Americas; ii) the attempt to stabilize 
conflicts in some of the neighboring countries, especially Venezuela; iii) the denial 
to engage the war on terror approach in South American territory, stressing the 
need not to securitize regional problems that in fact had its roots derived from 
the social inequalities, poverty or domestic violence. 
The debate about a new security architecture of the inter-American system 
stemmed from the need to adjust hemispheric institutional design in order to 
combat threats which have a non-estate nature6. As for this point, Brazil reacted 
positively to new conceptual bases to think hemispheric security: the country 
5 In WTO, for instance, Brazil articulated a coalition with developing countries, with the objective to enjoy a 
better position in the negotiations. In the UN Security Council, Brazil’s participation presented an emphasis 
on the need for redistributing seats among the Organization members so that it could include developing and 
least developed countries in its decision making process. Finally, a more intense participation in the IMF was 
seen as a good strategy to achieve better terms to the negotiation of the country’s debt.
6 These issues were analyzed in Villa, 1999.
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accepted the concept of multidimensional security7 – as institutionalized by the 
OAS in 2003 – as well as the new role for regional armed forces. However, Brazil 
opposed the proposal presented by the US delegation, according to which Armed 
Forces and national police forces cooperated in the fight against drugs, terrorism 
and even migration.
As regards South America, Brazil’s reaction aimed at avoiding that internal 
crisis escalating towards political instability in the regional sphere. Defined by 
Itamaraty’s discourse as “non-intervention without indifference” (Amorim, 2004) 
the role played by Brazil can be understood through concepts that entail democracy, 
political stability, regional security and economic integration, searching, at the 
same time, for a political initiative facing the United States.
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador – countries that went through political 
instability in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively – were objects of Lula’s 
administration special attention. Brazilian diplomacy led the creation of the Friends 
of Venezuela Group, an initiative considered to be the first moment of audacity 
in Brazil’s foreign policy (Carvalho, 2003). Gathering the OAS, Chile, United 
States, Mexico, Portugal and Spain, the Friends of Venezuela Group facilitated the 
negotiation between diverging actors in May 2003 – more than a year after the 
coup attempt against Hugo Chávez, in April 2002, which triggered the political 
crisis in Venezuela. As for the Bolivian crisis, in October 2003, Lula’s Special 
Adviser on Foreign Policy, Marco Aurélio Garcia, played an important role in 
the negotiations that led to a political solution that resulted in the renouncement 
of the President Sanchez de Lozada. As regards the 2005 institutional crisis in 
Ecuador, Brazil’s participation was determinant in the negotiation of a diplomatic 
agreement that established the exile, in the Brazilian Embassy, of President Lucio 
Gutiérrez, who was then transferred to Brasilia by Brazilian Air Force airplanes.
In respect to the adoption of the war on terror approach in South America, 
Brazil neither recognized the presence of terrorist groups in the region, nor accepted 
the denomination of some guerrillas as terrorist groups – despite US and Colombia’s 
pressures in this direction8. However, the denial to accept these approaches was 
7 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting from the Special Conference on Security (OEA/
Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that “states of the 
Hemisphere face both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, in 
view of their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature” (preamble). More 
specifically, “new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted 
responses by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the private 
sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and 
constitutional provisions of each state. Many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemispheric 
security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation” (4.k). Available 
at: <http://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%20
1%20-%2028%20OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf>. Access: 7 Aug. 2010.
8 It is worth mentioning that Barack Obama’s new national security strategy, launched on May 2010, 
abandoned the global war on terror doctrine. Despite defining Al-Qaeda as the main threat to United States 
security, the “Obama doctrine” defines American partnerships beyond United States traditional allies and 
includes countries such as China and India.
Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach
Re
vi
st
a 
Br
as
ile
ir
a 
de
 P
ol
ít
ic
a 
In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l
95
not followed by an alternative proposition, leading to a vacuum of initiative in 
the region, which was historically filled by the United States – especially in the 
Andean countries. 
The “worldlization” of brazilian foreign policy
By the end of Lula’s first mandate, it was possible to notice that the complete 
rupture expected when he was elected did not happen. Instead, the president 
conducted foreign policy according to the same pillars that characterized the 
“autonomy through participation”. During Lula’s second mandate, the initial 
efforts to differentiate Brazil’s foreign policy resulted in the expansion of some 
differences, beyond the institutional and multilateral spheres. In this period, 
Brazil’s security foreign policy presented a more active approach while Lula’s 
administration took advantage of the initiatives both in global and regional 
multilateralism. Particularly, this approach was evident through Brazil’s claim 
of a UN Security Council permanent membership; in the proposal to create 
an autonomous regional defense council at Unasur; and in the technological 
modernization of Brazilian military forces. All of these actions were underlined 
by the search for political objectives under a regional label.
Although the claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council does 
not constitute a new goal – it has been in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda since 
Itamar Franco’s government (1992-1993) –, Lula’s second mandate approach to this 
matter presents discontinuities in comparison to past administrations regarding 
the intensity and methods applied to accomplish this goal.
Since 1992, Brazilian diplomats have emphasized the importance of 
implementing a reform in United Nations structure so that the organization can 
reflect the changes observed in power distribution in the international scenario. 
Assuming the existence of a different international order, Brazilian government 
has since then put the incorporation of new actors as an indispensable measure 
to maintain the efficiency and reliability of the United Nations. Put differently, 
this doctrine associated Brazil’s aspiration with the process of democratization 
of international relations, suggesting that the incorporation of Brazil as the 
developing world representative in the permanent group of countries in the Security 
Council would contribute to minimize the legitimacy deficit in this international 
organization (Silva, 2004).
Despite essentially presenting elements of continuity in comparison to the 
doctrine established by previous governments, Lula’s foreign policy approach 
presented important discontinuities. Firstly, the reference on the democratization 
of international relations is as strong an idea as a political interest. Quoting Lula: 
“It is not enough to watch world events distantly and subordinately: we want our 
voice to be heard and respected. We are taking big steps on this direction”. (Silva, 
2004) In this sense, the president and the diplomats explicitly communicate the 
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means applied in order to pursue what this administration considers the country’s 
political interests to be. A similar conduct was taken towards the announcements 
of Brazil’s regional and global preferences.
Secondly, there is very strong belief that Brazil’s respectability throughout the 
world undergoes participation in the UN Security Council and that developing 
countries’ leaders are favorable to the Brazilian claim. This self-perception is 
reinforced by the presidential figure: “Our partners recognize that Brazil assumed 
its weight and importance in the community of nations”, affirms Lula (Silva, 2004).
It is possible that Brazil’s relative power in the international arena is 
misrepresented according to developing countries perceptions. However, there is no 
doubt that these actions aiming at adequate means and ends have led to some novel 
aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy. First, the action through coalitions was one of the 
main methods applied by diplomats during Lula’s administration, a trend in which 
the claim for a seat in the Security Council also fits: Brazil led the articulation of 
G-4 (constituted by Brazil, Germany, Japan and India), whose members consider 
themselves potential occupants of a permanent seat in the Council. Even in the 
case of a negative result – after United States and China blocked the possibility 
of reform in the Council –, Brazil was supported by a considerable number of 
South American countries and some important medium powers, such as France, 
Russia, Spain and China. As the Chinese vice-minister recognized, “Brazil is the 
greatest developing country in the Western Hemisphere and we attribute a great 
importance to its role in regional and international issues (…) China is disposed 
to intensify its collaborations with the Brazilian part as regards the reform on the 
Security Council” (Trevisan, 2004, A10)
Brazil’s efforts to participate on UN peace operations – notably in Haiti – 
can also be understood as a strategy circumscribed in the country’s aspiration of 
participating in the Council as a permanent member. It is relevant to underline 
that Brazil joined UN peace missions in East Timor and Angola during Cardoso’s 
governments. Nevertheless, the activism in the Haitian case reveals a more explicit 
way to aspire for a seat in that body9.
The consequences of this more active involvement towards regional security 
issues can be seen as a paradox. On one side, there is the Brazilian perspective 
of a multipolar world with strengthened regional powers. Brazil’s aspiration 
of affirming its autonomy and neutralizing United States military goals in the 
regional sphere can also be understood in this involvement, especially after Plan 
Colombia, considered by Brazilian government to be the main responsible for the 
militarization observed in the Andean and Amazon regions. On the other side, 
sending troops to Haiti can be understood as a message to the United States that 
9 As put in an article published in The Economist, “Brazil has long been a gentle and introverted giant, content 
to be a bystander on the world stage. Now that is changing”. Available at: <www.economist.com>. Access: 
30 Oct 2009.
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Brazil is able to share political and economic costs related to peace missions. This 
message is positive to the United States, since they are looking for partners with 
whom to share the costs of regional security.
Anyway, Brazilian action is innovative – it can’t be forgotten that it refused 
to send troops to Haiti in the beginning of the 90s, when this country was facing 
a crisis. However, this action lacks some necessary legitimacy degree (Soares de 
Lima, 2006), having all the decision processes been concentrated on the Executive, 
especially on the Presidency and the Defense Ministry.
Therefore, Lula’s multilateral action moves in the normative sphere through 
the re-affirmation of a discourse that can be summed up as follows: “be attentive 
to the need of those who are more vulnerable, defending a free, fair and egalitarian 
international trade, and democratization of deliberative instances. Our compromise 
with democracy and with popular participation is reflected in the purpose of 
working together to strengthen multilateralism, stimulating more transparent 
and legitimate forums, which are representative of international cooperation” 
(Amorim, 2004b). As regards these principles, it seems to exist no innovation, 
since diplomacy continues to have its traditional doctrinaire motivations: the 
pacifist discourse backed by negotiation and international intermediation as a 
way of resolving conflicts; and the re-affirmation of a juridicism that dates back 
to the 20th century. By adding to these two characteristics the democratization of 
the international system, in which prevails the existence of politically autonomous 
units, not subordinated to any superior, it is possible to understand why Lafer 
(2001) considers Brazil’s foreign policy to be “Grotian” .
To sum up, if the plea for a permanent seat in the Security Council was 
already present in Cardoso’s administration (Amorim, 1994; Guimarães, 1999), 
it was manifested with greater intensity during Lula’s government. Moreover, the 
deployment of Brazilian troops and command forces in Haiti reveals the rising of 
a new actor in Brazil’s foreign policy on security: the Ministry of Defense. All of 
the activities in Haiti – from training and sending troops to the coordination of 
Brazilian military and civil personnel – are in charge of the Ministry of Defense. 
Recently, a cooperation agreement signed by United States’ Department of Defense 
and Brazil’s Ministry of Defense also reveals a greater participation of this latter 
Ministry in foreign policy on security10. This could mean that the conduction 
of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda on security is not anymore monopolized by 
Itamaraty.
However, the most important income that derived from the emerging role 
of the Ministry of Defense was that global goals were associated to the goal of 
strengthening the national defense agencies, especially the Armed Forces and 
the construction of a collective and regional body on security. This idea can be 
10 The content of the agreement is available at: <https://www.defesa.gov.br/mostra_materia.php?ID_
MATERIA=34008>. Access: 15 Aug. 2010.
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accentuated if we singularize two measures taken by Lula’s administration which 
connected directly defense and security policies: the gradual modernization of 
national armed forces; and the proposal of creating a South American Defense 
Council. In September 2007, President Lula announced the creation of a working 
group which, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and coordination 
of Mangabeira Unger, then Secretary of Strategic Affairs, would formulate 
guidelines for a modernization plan directed to the Armed Forces. The Strategic 
Plan of National Defense – or Plan to Accelerate Growth (PAC, in Portuguese) 
in Defense, as it became known in the media – takes into account three broad 
goals: i) to review defense strategies; ii) to reactivate the domestic arms industry; 
iii) to assure the autonomy of defense policy. Directly linked to these goals, the 
PAC in Defense aims at addressing the following concrete concerns: i) what are 
the best strategies for peacetimes and war; ii) how to organize the Armed Forces, 
operationally equipped with cutting-edge technologically; iii) how to reactivate 
the national industry of armaments accordingly to the autonomy in defense; iv) 
how to identify the Armed Forces with the nation, especially on the defense of 
borders in the Amazon as a priority, compulsory military service and social tasks; 
and v) how to establish lines for the Armed Forces in situations of maintenance 
of order and the rule of law. 
Additionally, it doesn’t seem plausible that the modernization project of 
Brazilian armed forces is derived from an analogous modernization ongoing in 
any neighboring country. Instead, Brazil’s main motivation seems to reside in the 
projection of its hemispheric and global role, that is, in the search for adequacy 
with the country’s status of emerging global and multidimensional actor – which 
include not only economic but also political and security aspects. “Brazil is well-
positioned to initiate a sustained arms buildup increasingly supported by its own 
domestic industries (…) The choice of the three finalist aircrafts – significantly, 
two are from NATO member states and one is from a state that might as well 
be – suggests something of essential importance about the way Brazil views its 
future. Despite shifting geopolitical realities around the world and its own rise 
to regional prominence over the next decade, Brazil does not appear to foresee a 
major conflict or even an adversarial relationship with the West” (Stratfor, 2008)11.
The proposal presented by Brazilian Unasur delegation to create a 
regional body of defense can also be interpreted as a measure aligned with the 
country’s political goal towards the region. In this sense, the process of “South 
Americanization” could be understood as “an important leverage” to build up 
Brazil’s national development project (Monteiro, 2001, p. 2) in which “collective 
security complements national security,” (Idem, p. 4). As Medeiros points out, 
“The emerging question is: to what extent is regional integration as proposed by 
11 This note refers to an international bidding process referring the purchase of military aircrafts by the 
Brazilian Air Force
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Brazil an end in itself (i.e., an aim to promote the interests of the whole region) 
– or is it a means to achieve the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy? (Medeiros, 
2010, p. 175)
This reflection becomes more striking when one observes that, especially 
in Lula’s second mandate, the country adopts a foreign security policy with a 
more incisive character. Two events can be cited in this direction. Firstly, the 
South American Defense Council could be seen as an instrument of collective 
defense. The idea is considered to be strategic for Brazil’s future in the region, 
according to the Presidency’s Center for Strategic Affairs (Núcleo de Assuntos 
Estratégicos da Presidência da República – NAE, in Portuguese). Secondly, the 
Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim’s, campaign throughout South America, at the 
end of 2007, to promote the establishment of a regional collective defense body 
(Medeiros, ibid., p. 176).
More recently, one of the steps forward taken by Brazilian diplomacy on 
security issues was the recent mediation played by Brazil and Turkey on an 
agreement with Iran. On May 2010, the three countries signed a document – 
known as the Tehran Declaration – through which the Iranian government 
committed itself to send 1,2 ton of Uranium to Turkey, where the material would 
be enriched and sent back to Tehran in order to be applied to medical research.
The agreement represented an effort of Brazilian diplomacy to avoid the 
renewal of sanctions towards that Persian country in the UN Security Council. 
However, the initiative can also be interpreted as an attempt to leap further 
towards international recognition of Brazil’s capability to build dialogues on hard 
topics on the world security agenda and, in this sense, to advance on its quest for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite the UN Security Council’s 
refusal to accept the agreement as a confidence building move, it is worth saying 
that it was the first time that a developing country assumed a proactive position 
in core negotiations on world security and stability.
South america: still on the top, but with a different emphasis
South America has always been on the top of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda 
(Almeida, 2008; Bandeira, 2006; Onuki, 2006). Indeed, the country has always 
seen the region as an area of its natural influence, given its proportions on territory, 
population and economy (Bandeira, 2006). Nevertheless, Brazilian government’s 
main efforts were more often directed to intraregional trade relations. 
As for the political dialogues, these rarely evoked the multilateral coordination 
between South American countries in security matters. Moreover, the predominant 
approach towards security issues was characterized by bilateral geometries and 
by a reactive position.
It can also be argued that United States influence in some of South American 
countries – notably Colombia and Peru – favored a more militarized treatment 
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towards some of the problems faced by these countries. The most evident example 
can be found in anti-drug policies led by the United States in Andean countries. 
Indeed, Plan Colombia – considered to be the highlight of American foreign 
policy to fight drug production – has presented an unequivocal solution to the 
problem: the military one. The securitization of the drug problem was gradually 
deepened and culminated with the creation of battalions specialized on assuring 
the success of fumigation operations in Colombia. Even US involvement with the 
Colombian armed conflict was read through the narcotized and securitized lenses 
that characterized American foreign policy towards the region12.
In this context, Lula’s administration represents a watershed regarding the 
promotion of an approach based on pillars different from the bilateral-reactive-
militarized tripod prevailing in the previous period. An emblematic initiative 
in this sense is the creation of Union of South American Nations (Unasur, in 
Spanish), in 2008.
Stemmed from a Brazilian proposal, the Unasur project resulted from 
numerous summits13 involving South American chiefs of State and government 
representatives. The initiative was formalized in the Cuzco Declaration (December 
8th, 2004), a document in which the participants affirmed their determination to 
gradually build a South American identity and citizenship as well as to develop 
a regional locus of integration in political, economical, social, cultural and 
environmental issues, besides its emphasis on infrastructure as a channel to reduce 
asymmetries among the countries of the region. The project was then temporarily 
called as South American Community of States (CASA, in Spanish), until the Isla 
Margarita Summit (Venezuela), in 2007, when it was renamed Unasur.
Despite the modifications on the initial draft, its main innovative traits 
remained intact: i) rupture with the bilateralism that has prevailed up to that 
moment in South American countries intra-regional relations; and ii) rupture 
with the priority given to trade in previous integration processes developed within 
the region. These two characteristics are directly related to the approach given 
to security issues by Lula’s administration, especially after his second mandate 
(2006-2010).
Firstly, Unasur is essentially a multilateral project, an aspect which is 
reinforced in its constitutive treaty: “[Unasur is seen as a] decisive step towards 
the strengthening of multilateralism and the force of law in international relations, 
in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and fair world” (Tratado Constitutivo 
da Unasul, Preâmbulo).
12 For more information, see: Viana, 2009.
13 The first dialogue that promoted a closer cooperation between South American countries happened in 
2000, at the first Summit of South American Presidents, in Brasilia (Brazil). It is worth mentioning that this 
attempt to approximate South American leaders happened in a context of regional apprehension because of 
controversies surrounding Plan Colombia. On the third summit, the participants of Cuzco Summit (Ecuador, 
2004) decided to create the South American Community of States (CASA). From 2000 to 2008 there were 
seven summits of South American presidents. 
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It was the first time that an institutional and multilateral initiative was 
launched in South America. Thus, with its 12 State members14, Unasur represents 
a rupture with the bilateralism or unilateralism that has since then characterized 
the relations between the governments of the region. 
Furthermore, the emerging South American bloc constituted a multilateral 
project which, for the first time, did not privilege the trade agenda among its 
members. Among the multiple goals upon which Unasur is structured15, three 
of them open room for debates related to security issues: i) to strengthen the 
political dialogue between State members, aiming to assure a coordination space 
in order to reinforce South American integration and Unasur’s participation in the 
international scenario; ii) to stimulate the coordination between South American 
States’ specialized agencies, respecting international norms, with the objective 
of strengthening the fight against terrorism, corruption, “the world problem of 
drugs”, human trafficking, weapons traffic, transnational organized crime and 
other threats, as well as to address disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear and 
massive destruction weapons and mines removal; and iii) to exchange information 
and experience in defense matters.
Some elements are noteworthy on this excerpt. First of all, it seems plausible 
to argue that the choice for the terms “the world problem of drugs” reveals a South 
American historical claim to a broader understanding of the fight against drugs. 
Indeed, many governments in the region – especially those whose international 
image has been affected by this problematic – have protested against the supply-
side-approach16 underlying developed United States policies to combat the problem 
of drugs, that is, the idea that the most efficient way to fight it is to eradicate the 
problem on the source axis, not on the demand one. South American presidents 
have insisted that the responsibility on the existence of narcotraffic lies also on 
those countries whose citizens largely consume drugs. Thus, the emphasis on the 
drug problem as a “world problem” must be read in this context.
Another interesting aspect related to the goals highlighted above is the 
formalization of the cooperation in defense matters between South American 
States. This is an ongoing practice in some countries of the region, notably 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, initiatives which were also intensified 
during Lula’s mandate. Brazil’s Federal Police has promoted joint operations 
with neighboring countries’ police forces to fight organized crime, often relying 
on the United States support as regards logistics, personnel and finance. In early 
14 UNASUR members are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.
15 Unasur’s Constitutive Treaty presents 21 goals for the integration project, which include economical, 
political, social and cultural spheres. These are specified in the second and third articles of the above 
mentioned treaty, available at: <www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/TratadoUnasurBrasil08.pdf>. Access: 
August 9th, 2010.
16 To see how this approach was used by United States in its anti-drug policy, visit the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy website, at: <http://www.ondcp.gov/policy/ndcs.html>. Access: 14 Aug. 2010.
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2006, there were nine operations17 along the boundaries with other countries 
nearby the Amazon forest. Additionally, through the establishment of the 
Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) in 2001, which includes surveillance and 
alarm units, the Brazilian government shared data collected by the system18 with 
Colombia, so that this country could expand its military, police and environmental 
control over the Amazon region (Uriguen, 2005, p. 182; Guzzi, op. cit). Similar 
measures were also taken towards Peru and Ecuador with whom Brazil signed 
military cooperation agreements, which a schedule of annual meetings between 
the Parties.
As regards security, there is another interesting aspect in the process of 
consolidating Unasur. A careful analysis of the documents on the initial period 
of South American integration reveals that there was an attempt to associate the 
emphasis on poverty and social inequality eradication with the de-securitization 
of some problems faced by the countries in the region. More specifically, the 
documents often invoked the terms “citizen security” to refer to the need for 
States to deliver better life conditions and economic development to their citizens. 
This development is here broadly understood, involving income fair and balanced 
distribution, access to education, promotion to social inclusion and cohesion, 
as well as the environmental protection19. After an inter-ministerial meeting 
in 2005, involving Ministries of Justice, Defense and others in charge of issues 
related to this concept of security, South American leaders recognized that “social 
inequality is one of the causes of violence and insecurity in South America, at the 
same time that the latter hampers better levels of social equality” (Declaration on 
Citizen Security in South America, 2005, preamble). Regardless of the attempt 
to formalize regional cooperation on a new approach towards security, the term 
“citizen security” was gradually removed from the official documents, which may 
17 These are COBRA and CRAF operations, on the border with Colombia; PEBRE (Peru); and VEBRA 
(Venezuela). Besides these, in the regions defined as a second priority, the operations performed were: GUISU 
(Guyana and Suriname); BRABO (Bolivia); “Ribeirinho”, along all Amazon border; Alliance (Paraguay); 
and the Southern Cone (Argentina and Uruguay).
18 Seeking to respond to a challenge identified by surveillance systems data – according to which most of 
the drug entering Brazil was carried by small planes –, the government approved, through the Decree N. 
5.144/2004, the Destruction Shot Law (Lei do Tiro de Destruição, in Portuguese, which regulates a 1988 
law on aircrafts intercepting in Brazilian aerial space, in case these are suspected to be carrying illegal drugs 
into the country. The previous law – Law N. 9.614/1998 – determined that “Once legally specified means of 
coercion are exhausted, the aircraft will be classified as hostile, thus subjected to destruction”. The Decree 
approved in 2004 specifies concepts such as “means of coercion”, hostile aircraft” and “destruction”. The full 
content of the Decree N. 5.144 is available at: <https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2004/
Decreto/D5144.htm>. Access: 07 Aug. 2010.
19 See: Declaração de Ayacucho (available at: <http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/reuniao-presidencial-de-
cusco/declaracao-de-ayacucho/>; access: 14 Aug. 2010); Declaração Presidencial e Agenda Prioritária (available 
at: <http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/i-reuniao-de-chefes-de-estado/declaracao-presidencial-e-agenda-
prioritaria>; access: 14 Aug. 2010) and Declaração sobre Segurança Cidadã na América do Sul (available at: 
<http://casa.mre.gov.br/documentos/i-reuniao-de-chefes-de-estado/declaracao-sobre-seguranca-cidada-na-
america-do-sul>; access: 14 Aug. 2010).
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illustrate the difficulty to find a common ground on de-securitization matters 
between South American countries, as well as the lack of priority of this approach 
in some of the foreign policy agendas.
Despite the broad range of themes on Unasur’s scope, it can be argued that 
the South American integration project dedicated a privileged space for defense 
and security issues. More specifically, beside the four-body institutional structure20 
approved in the final version of the bloc’s constitutive treaty, State members 
accepted, in 2008, Brazil’s proposal to create the South American Defense 
Council (CDS, in Spanish). The objective of the new institution is to promote the 
cooperation between Unasur members in security issues, the coordination on joint 
defense policies, the exchange of armed forces personnel, the joint participation 
on United Nations peace operations, among others. 
Therefore, the CDS does not assume a conventional military alliance 
between South American countries such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). With the objective of clarifying the traits that differentiate CDS from 
past international initiatives on security, Brazil’s Minister of Defense, Nelson 
Jobim, visited South American countries before the Brasilia Summit (May 2008). 
According to the Brazilian government, a forum specifically dedicated to defense 
and security matters in the region could avoid crises such as the one that involved 
Colombia and Ecuador in 2008. Moreover, CDS’s institutional deepening could 
contribute to defend the region from potential external interventions. Nevertheless, 
South American leaderships did not reach a consensus on that occasion: the 
Brazilian proposition was only immediately accepted by Argentina, Bolivia, 
Venezuela and – with some reservations – by Uruguay. Beside the disagreement 
between Andean countries on the decision-making procedures to be incorporated 
to the Council, Colombia also insisted that OAS constituted the appropriate forum 
to discuss issues related to regional security.
Despite the approval of the CDS by Unasur’s members on December 2008, 
the possibility that the proposal is interpreted by South American countries as an 
instrument for Brazil’s projection may become an obstacle for consolidating the 
CDS. This defense body could certainly improve Brazilian military capability. 
However, being a mechanism of defense cooperation, it doesn’t seem plausible to 
hold that the CDS could induce regional suspicion as regards Brazil’s motivations, 
or that it could trigger an arms race in South America (Amaral, 2004, p. 32).
Anyhow, Unasur’s CDS fills a vacuum related to autonomous initiatives 
towards South America security issues, in which United States usually takes 
the lead (Hirst, 2003; Villa, 2007). Its most distinguishing trait is the quest 
for multilateral solutions to conflicts in the region, which downplays unilateral 
measures as well as the role of OAS in South American security issues, considered 
20 The South American bloc is composed by the Chiefs of State and Government Council (UNASUR’s main 
decision body); the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council; the Delegates Council; and the General Secretariat.
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to “not sufficient for the current challenges and threats presented in the continent” 
(Cepik, 2009, p. 230).
The mediation played at the end of 2008 by Unasur on the Bolivian crisis 
involved Evo Morales’ administration and indigenous groups on one side, and 
governors of Eastern provinces on the other. The conflict threatened to trigger 
a conflict escalation and, then, the destabilization of Bolivia’s political scenario. 
As put by Emilio Mendez do Valle (2008), Unasur’s mediation meant, firstly, 
that South American countries could formulate solutions through their own 
means, that is, without United States mediation; secondly, the strong support to 
Morales and to the democracy on the country represented a joint South American 
initiative towards Andean countries. To Brazil, this meant an assertive reaction to 
the critique that its security policy – as well as the radius of this one – is limited 
to Mercosur (Pagliari, 2009).
Despite the optimism surrounding Unasur, the region still faces the 
persistence of bilateral problems between some of its members – for instance, those 
involving Colombia and Ecuador, or Venezuela and Colombia.
One of the first challenges faced by the South American bloc consists of the 
close relations between Colombia and the United States. The history and nature 
of these relations conflict directly with one of the main motivations underlying 
the CDS: the autonomous conduction of South American security agenda. 
The dynamics of the presidential meeting in Bariloche (Argentina), on August 
2009, was affected by the announcement made by Colombian government of a 
cooperation agreement with the United States through which Bogotá authorized 
American troop presence in seven military bases in the Andean country. The 
initiative was justified as a continuity of the bilateral efforts to fight narcotraffic 
and terrorism in the Andean region, as well as a necessary measure face the removal 
of American troops from Manta military base (Ecuador). Brazil21 and Venezuela 
critiques considered the measure a threat to regional stability, once it could result 
in the permanent presence of US troops in the region. Moreover, Brazil accused the 
agreement of being incompatible with the Colombian government’s declarations 
that the guerrillas were significantly weakened during Uribe’s administration. 
During the discussions, South American Presidents pressured Colombia to reveal 
the content of the agreement – which had not been signed at the time – as well as 
to accept a proposal related to transparency on cooperation in military matters. 
However, divergences observed in the Bariloche presidential summit were not 
reflected in the declaration finally approved by all Unasur members.
This was not the first occasion in which Colombia was considerably isolated 
in multilateral talks with its South American neighbors. Indeed, the military aspect 
of United States presence in Colombia constitutes a constant topic of concern 
21 One of these military bases is about 50km distant from the boundaries with the region known as “Cabeça 
de Cachorro”, on Amazon Northwest.
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towards the armed conflict faced by the Andean country. Traditionally, Brazil 
sustains that political or violent conflict in South America countries should be 
interpreted as a social-rooted problem. As a conflict stemmed from development 
gaps and social and political inequality, Brazil holds that its resolution can’t be 
found in the military sphere22.
If the two declarations of the CDS23 suggest some advances on the intra-
regional cooperation in defense matters – such as data disclosure and transparency 
on the conduction of military exercises –, the South American Council was put 
to the test on matters of its members’ relations with extra-regional countries, 
as it was the case of the agreement signed by the United States and Colombia. 
Indeed, Unasur’s constitutive treaty and CSN’s statute reveal a gap in respect 
to how the previous sub-regional integration projects – namely, Community of 
Andean Nations (CAN, in Spanish) and Mercosur – and the repertoire of bilateral 
cooperation agreements with non-South American countries will be articulated 
inside Unasur’s structure. These are challenges with which the South American 
bloc still has to handle, given the divergences in security agenda among some of 
its members.
For Brazil Unasur is also a bridge for the cooperation with neighboring 
countries, especially the Bolivian case. Vaz (2002) defends that the current 
peculiarity of the security relations among South American countries is given 
by “the fact that potentials threats don’t emanate from state policies”. But if 
any moment there was possibility what Brazilian interest in matters of security 
would be threatened by other South American state, that happened in the episode 
that embraces the (re) nationalization of gas and petroleum by the Evo Morales 
government on May 1st 2006. That was the most polemic and defensive moment 
within South America exactly because it involved a problem of energetic security. 
Brazil is the first client of the Bolivian gas (having imported more than 30 million 
cubic feet from Bolivia in 2006). On the other side, the Brazilian company, 
Petrobras– Brazil’s Petroleum – was the main investor in these Bolivian gas and 
oil sectors and all of the refineries were operated by Petrobras. But the principal 
impact derived from that fact is that part of the Brazilian industry had changed 
its technological matrix in order to adequate this to the consumption of natural 
22 Regardless of the consideration that the Colombian crisis is a matter of domestic nature, the large boundary 
that Brazil shares with Colombia has stimulated some concerns about the resulting scenario of offensive military 
operations led by Uribe’s administration in the Colombian Amazon forest. Particularly, Brazil fears that 
guerrillas can use the Brazilian territory as a base for operations or temporal refuge to escape from Colombian 
army’s offensive. Brazil is also concerned with the possibility that drug traffic groups use Brazilian territory 
in order to expand coca-leaf crops or to install cocaine processing labs. In this regard, the Federal Police of 
Brazil decided to promote joint operations with neighbor countries’ police forces to fight organized crime.
23 See Santiago Declaration (available at: <http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/consejo-de-defensa-suramericano/
documentos-oficiales/57-espanol/161-declaracion-de-santiago-de-chile-2009>; access: 15 Aug. 2010) 
and Quito Declaration (available at: <http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/consejo-de-defensa-suramericano/
documentos-oficiales/57-espanol/150-reunion-extraordinaria-de-ministros-de-relaciones-exteriores-y-de-
defensa-de-la-unasur>; access: 15 Aug. 2010).
Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana
106
gas. The episode involving the Bolivian government also arose more problems 
by the Brazilian government because it meant the participation of other regional 
actors with political projects that, at first sight, seemed to be competing with 
Brazil. Especially the Brazilian sectors, inside and out of the government, saw 
in the episodes that followed the Bolivian nationalization a strong influence of 
the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, as well as the Venezuelan oil company 
PDVSA – Venezuela’s Petroleum. Despite the exaggeration in the affirmation of 
Chávez’s regional leadership potential, it is true that his administration took the 
regional leading role from Brazil, contributing to an uncomfortable diplomatic 
atmosphere between both countries24. However, this crisis involving Bolivia has 
also revealed that old negative images, as that of Brazilian sub-imperialism, are 
still strong in the imagery of nationalist sectors in South American countries. 
However, the Brazilian nationalistic wave erected by the Bolivian nationalization 
accused Lula’s administration of not being firm in defense of the national 
interest and Petrobras’ interests in Bolivia; Lula’s government maintained one 
moderated position and continued to manage the situation inside the boundaries 
of the diplomatic treatment. The main example of that moderate position was 
the delay of some military maneuvers that the Brazilian army had scheduled 
exactly for the weeks when the nationalization happened. The rationale of the 
Brazilian government seems to have been action in a pragmatic way, so that the 
process of integration would be preserved and, in the medium range, could have 
accommodated Brazil’s, the Petrobras’s and the Bolivian government’s interests. 
That in fact happened when the Petrobras signed an agreement of compensation 
by the investments that Brazilian companies, all in the infra-structure sector, like 
refineries, made in Bolivia since 1996. At the same time, negotiations on new 
Brazilian investments were retaken25.
Bolivia, on the other hand, also brought to Unasur’s multilateralism its 
first diplomatic victory when, in the end of 2008, the new institution avoided 
escalation and greater instability of Morales’s government. Reinforcing democracy, 
Unasur avoided a new delay in the process of regional integration26. “As a lesson 
24 This major initiative drives of the Venezuelan government was manifested under, at least, two aspects: 
the purchase of public securities of Argentina’s and Ecuador’s external debts; and the polemical proposal of 
building a South American pipeline whose extension would be from the South of Venezuela until Patagonia 
(Argentina). On the other side, addressing the Brazilian Congress, Chancellor Celso Amorim expressed his 
displeasure with Venezuela’s behavior during the nationalization of the Bolivian gas. 
25 On this matter, check: “Brasil deverá anunciar a retomada de investimentos na Bolívia, available at: http://
tv2.rtp.pt/noticias/?article=90184&visual=3&layout=10. Access on 08/15/2010. 
26 In Morales’s government the conflict had its starting point in the claim of the Bolivian Eastern provinces 
of managing of autonomous way the resources that derived the exploration and commerce of the gas and 
petroleum. As it is well known in the Eastern provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Sucre and Tarija 
concentrate greater dynamism of the Bolivian economy because these provinces are the producers of gas and 
petroleum. Thus it is very common amid local elites according to claim to their provinces a huge part of 
Bolivian welfare and, therefore, the Bolivian East would have more rights from the profits that are derived 
from the exploration of gas and oil. This idea is rejected both by Morales administration and by poorest 
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from experience, the agility of the South America reaction signaled to others 
countries that South America would not accept any separatism , as well as any 
external intervention in the continent” (Cepik, 2009, p. 238). In others words, 
Unasur gave an autonomous answer within South America’s security complex, 
addressing a problem whose dynamics is internal to that complex. For countries 
like Brazil and Argentina the solution through Unasur was an excellent result in 
political terms and in security terms. In the case, mainly for Brazil, the success of 
Unasur’s mediation passed the first test, and confirmed its conviction according 
to which the process of regional integration needs multilateral mechanism to be 
speedily accessed in particular moments of crisis which threaten the process of 
integration. In the second case, because Brazil (and Argetina too) depends so much 
on the supply of the Bolivian gas, national interest was delivered from a collective 
initiative. It is necessary to remember that the rebel groups in the Bolivian Eastern 
provinces in a given moment began to attack the gas infra-structure, which affected 
production and supply.
partnership and dispute involving the united States: 
impacts of an assertive approach
Studies on American security policy towards Latin America agree that this 
region does not figure as a strategic priority to United States interests (see Vilas, 
2005; Bonilla, 2004; Messari, 2004). In general, this assertion is correct but it is 
important to mention that it neglects one important point: although, since the 
Cold War, South America is not as relevant in strategic terms as other regions – 
such as the Middle East, Western Europe and Asia –, the United States has kept a 
coherent security policy for the region27. This is possible due to a solid consensus 
among Democrats and Republicans that guarantees the continuity of goals 
At the same time, differently from the past, now the United States has to 
deal with threats of a distinct nature in the region: communist states, parties or 
movements are not anymore perceived as actual threats, but actors and processes 
such as drug traffickers, migration, political instability, weapons traffic, money 
laundry, terrorism – all of them of non-estate nature.
social groups (and their organizations), which claim that that the resources must be managed and distributed 
broadly in the Bolivian state, beside the State would have the control over supplies. The top point of this 
polarization came in September 2008, when the governors of the these provinces, all opposition, stimulated 
local groups to violent actions against indigenous groups and gas infra-structure that resulted in more of two 
dozen of deaths, mainly between indigenous and peasant groups. By fearing the escalation of the conflict, 
Unasur called for an emergency meeting, held in Santiago de Chile, on September 15th. The strong support 
and pressures from Unasur to the Morales government and the internal democratic process were decisive to 
stabilize and to pace, at least temporarily, the Bolivian political conflict. 
27 Plan Colombia, the allocation of military bases, anti-drug policies and anti-terrorist initiatives are some 
of the measures that validate this assumption.
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In this sense, September eleven has presented impacts over the security policy 
towards South America. Indeed, one important change was the emergence of 
conceptual and political changes in the way American decision-makers perceived 
the relation between threat and terrorism. Particularly, the United States global 
strategy after September eleven propelled a conceptual and material overlap 
between the war against narcotraffic and the war against terrorism – which 
was strongly supported by Álvaro Uribe’s administration. Therefore, from the 
conceptual and practical perspective, the Colombian guerrilla, as well as the 
paramilitaries, became synonymous of terrorism (Villa, 2007).
Brazilian government and its diplomacy diverged from the Colombian and 
American approach towards guerrilla groups and decided not to consider these 
armed groups as terrorists, fearing this association could block any possibility of 
demobilization negotiations. Instead, Brazil offered to participate as a mediator 
of peace talks, if invited by the government of Colombia. However, this call 
was never made, so Brazil had no active participation in negotiation processes 
(Hoffmeister 2003). 
Another aspect that was subjected to disagreement between Brazil and United 
States particularly regards the “new architecture of inter-American system” in order 
to combat threats which have a non-estate nature. One of the first steps towards 
this new system was the institutionalization of the Conference of Ministers of 
Defense, in 1995. On the first meeting, the US delegation presented as one of 
its objectives the wish that South American countries’ Armed Forces cooperated 
with their national police forces to combat coca crops and other perceptions of 
non-territorial threats, terrorism and even migration.
The decision to associate Armed Forces and Police in the fight against 
drug traffic has not been consensual among most of South American countries. 
Brazil, for example, accepts the concept of multidimensional security28 – as 
institutionalized by the OAS in 2003 – as well as the new role for regional armed 
forces, but it disagrees with the United States on the idea that those should be 
used primarily to combat threats as drug traffic and terrorism.
The Sixth Conference of Ministers of Defense (2004), held in Quito 
(Ecuador), exposed the tensions between these two perspectives. Especially due 
to Brazilian pressure, the meeting, which aimed at formulating a type of security 
28 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting from the Special Conference on Security (OEA/
Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that “states of the 
Hemisphere face both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, in 
view of their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature” (preamble). More 
specifically, “new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted 
responses by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the private 
sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and 
constitutional provisions of each state. Many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemispheric 
security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation” (4.k). Available 
at: <http://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%20
1%20-%2028%20OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf>. Access: 7 Aug. 2010.
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architecture for the continent, culminated with the rejection, by most of the 
participant countries, of the proposition that the Armed Forces were turned into 
a security agency, with police functions (Guzzi, op., cit, 2007, p. 43)
It is noteworthy that the United States proposal may have been motivated not 
only by changes in perception of threats since the end of the Cold War, but also by 
the anti drug policies implemented in Bolivia and Peru during the 1990s and in 
Colombia since 1980s (Thoumi, 2003). In these countries, the illegal production 
of drugs has been fought both by security agencies (police) and defense agencies 
(mainly the army). Since late 1990s, however, the case of Colombia experienced 
a more dramatic change in this direction, especially as regards the involvement of 
military personnel with security issues (Thoumi, 2002; Viana, 2009).
This approach was gradually materialized through United States narcotized 
foreign policy towards Colombia (Crandall, 2002) and culminated with the 
approval of Plan Colombia, a package of US$ 1,2 billion implemented in 1999. 
Initially thought by President Pastrana as a Colombian Marshall Plan, the version 
and budget finally approved by American Congress directed 80% of the resources 
– until now, approximately US$ 3,8 billions – to intelligence, training, personnel, 
arms and equipments dedicated to combat drug traffic in Colombia (Isacson, 2006).
Brazil’s reservations towards Plan Colombia are related to the emphasis on 
military strategy to solve the drug problem and the protracted conflict in the 
Andean country. Expressed since Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration, 
these objections to Plan Colombia sustained the thesis that the United States 
policy may have spill over effects on other South American countries, that is, the 
execution of Plan Colombia could result not only in the displacement of drug 
crops, but also of the refining activities (Hofmeister, 2003, p. 51). Moreover, “the 
strength of the positions of the United States implies obstacles to the project of 
South American integration promoted by Brazil” (Castro, 2003, pp. 69-70).
The idea that the strengthening of American presence in Colombia could 
represent a precedent for United States military engagement in South America was 
stressed with the installation of seven United States military bases in Colombia, 
announced in 2009. The cooperation agreement signed between these two 
countries was seen as an alternative to the withdrawal of bases from Panama 
(Howard air force base) in 1999, from Puerto Rico (Vieques naval base) in 2003 
and from Ecuador (Manta air force base) in 2009. United States removal from 
these countries demanded that its Department of Defense sought, through the 
Southern Command, alternatives for American military presence in the region 
not only to monitor the Caribbean drug transit zone and the production area 
(Bolivia, Colombia and Peru), but also to support United States war on terror.
Moreover, it can be argued that the United States took advantage of the 
absence, of regional security initiatives from the main states in the region. The 
Paraguayan Congress approval to the temporary allocation of United States 
troops can also be interpreted as a result of the security and defense vacuum, 
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considering Mercosur main members’ omission in relation to the perception of 
threats in the region known as Triple Border – a reference to the geographical 
limits between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (Flores, 2005/2006, p. 37). In 
this regard, the negotiations aiming at the allocation of troops in Paraguay and 
Peru were responded by Brazil and Argentina through an outline of some military 
measures by the end of 2006.
However, it is important to mention that there were some security issues 
towards which Brazilian and American governments agreed. Interestingly, former 
president Cardoso (1994-2002) shared with the United States the perception that 
drug trafficking and weapon smuggling “posed a threat to national sovereignty”. 
This announcement, made in 1996, as aligned with the bilateral Agreement to 
Combat Drug Trafficking, signed in April 1995, which launched a financial and 
technical cooperation between United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Brazil’s Federal Police (Martins 
Filho, 1999).
During this period – which we consider to be the “reactive” phase of 
Brazilian foreign policy of Lula’s administration –, there were other moments of 
cooperation between the two countries, especially involving the Triple Border. 
Once identifying threats related to money laundry in this region, the United 
States – with Argentinean support – has suggested that Brazil established a regime 
to regulate financial and bank operations in the Triple Border.
After 9/11, the suspects towards the possibility of terrorist groups’ activities 
in the region – added to the perception that they were not being carefully guarded 
by the police and intelligence agencies of the countries comprehended in the Triple 
Border – were accentuated. Thus, the United States State Department announced, 
in March 2006, that the Agency of Immigration and Customs Inspection would 
join the Argentinean, Brazilian and Paraguayan governments in order to combat 
the money laundry and other financial crimes in the Triple Border Area. Moreover, 
the State Department associated this region to radical Muslim groups funding, 
such as Hezbollah and Hamas, link assumed to date back to July 1994, when there 
was a terrorist attack against the Mutual Israeli Argentina Association (AMIA, 
in Spanish). 
In this context, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed an Antiterrorist 
Agreement to patrol their common boundaries. Additionally, Brazil created, in 
November 2005, the Regional Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguaçu, which was 
thought as a national agency that would gradually evolve towards a pivotal unity 
for cooperation with its neighbors Argentina and Paraguay.
Final remarks
The analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy security agenda during Lula’s 
administration leads to the observation of a heterogeneous approach through the 
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President’s two mandates. While the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a more 
reactive approach towards security issues, the second one (2006-2010) presented 
an assertive position.
Brazil’s security agenda during Lula’s second mandate was significantly 
changed in terms of its geographical scope and instruments through which it 
was exercised. Indeed, this article sustained that the foreign policy on this sphere 
incorporated more systematically global issues, such as the Iran nuclear weapons 
negotiations and UN peace missions as a channel to accelerate the country’s quest 
for a permanent seat in the Security Council of this Organization.
South America – which has constantly been an object of Brazil’s foreign 
policy attention – was also approached differently by Lula’s administration. Despite 
being a geographical space historically privileged in Brazil foreign relations, South 
America was often regarded as a locus for economic exchange. Thus, the emphasis 
on security underlying the regional integration project – through Unasur’s CDS 
– can be read as a thematic fundamental difference in comparison with past 
administrations. Moreover, the multilateral answer to security problems faced by 
South American countries also represents a shift in relation to the bilateral approach 
that has characterized dialogues on security in this region. It also implies that 
inter-American institutions, like the OAS and its concept of “new architecture of 
security”, do not offer answers that take into account a regional, more autonomous 
perspective. The OAS “(…) is not sufficient for the current challenges and threats 
that are present in the continent. In this sense Unasur draws a different approach 
from that which has been asserted from the OAS (…)” (Cepik, 2009, p. 230)
It is, thus, interesting to stress how the promotion of a security agenda 
can be read through the lines of the development of integration projects in the 
South American experience. In other words, threat perception was not perceived 
through security lenses only: it was interpreted as a challenge to the integration 
efforts in the region.
Once the CDS was structured on the idea that the region should develop a 
more autonomous agenda on security, United States’ presence in some of South 
American countries is interpreted by Brazil as a threat to the integration efforts in 
the region. At the same time, the creation of the South American Council aims 
at fulfilling a vacuum left by Brazil’s lack of initiative towards South American 
security topics – a space that has been historically taken by the United States. Thus, 
it seems plausible to suggest that the consolidation of South American integration 
project will conflict with the external relations that some of the countries in the 
region – namely Colombia and Peru – present with the United States. This scenario 
will certainly lead to further challenges in the quest for Unasur to perform a more 
preeminent role in international scenario.
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abstract
Brazil’s security agenda during Lula’s administration was not homogeneous through the 
two mandates: the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a reactive approach towards security 
topics, while the second one (2006-2010) was more assertive. More specifically, the shift 
occurred in terms of both its geographical scope – once it incorporated global issues in a 
more systematic way –, and instruments through which the security agenda was exercised, 
given the multilateral initiative of Unasur’s CDS.
resumo
A agenda de segurança do governo Lula não foi homogênea durante os dois mandatos: 
o primeiro período (2002 – 2006) revelou uma postura reativa quanto às questões de 
segurança, enquanto o Segundo mandato (2006 – 2010) foi postura mais assertiva. 
Mais especificamente, a mudança ocorreu em termos de escopo geográfico – uma 
vez incorporadas as questões globais de maneira mais sistemática – e em termos de 
instrumentos por meio dos quais a agenda de segurança foi exercida – dada a criação do 
Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano. 
Key-words: Lula’s security agenda; assertive approach; South American Defense Council (CDS).
palavras-chave: agenda de segurança de Lula; política externa afirmativa; Conselho de 
Defesa Sul-americano.
